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Government often has sought to regulate soliciting and canvassing. A
civic motivation to protect citizenry from crime, fraud, and undue annoy-
ance has led to the promulgation of innumerable regulations by states and
municipalities. Conversely, the door-to-door dissemination of ideas per-
vades history as an ennobled vehicle for meagerly financed causes seeking
grass roots support.' Judicial determinations reflect the strident clash of
these competing interests. "Adjustment of the inevitable conflict between
free speech and other interests is a problem as persistent as it is perplex-
ing.",2
This Comment will explore constitutional challenges to governmental
regulation of noncommercial door-to-door canvassing and solicitation.
Religious, charitable, social, and political groups have launched numer-
ous, often successful, attacks upon these controls. The United States
Supreme Court has held the sale of religious tracts to be incidental to the
primary purposes of door-to-door evangelists, and hence outside the scope
of commercial solicitation regulations. 3 License taxes imposed upon non-
commercial canvassers have been ruled unconstitutional as prior restraints
upon the exercise of protected first amendment rights. 4 Ordinances grant-
ing unbridled discretion to officials to determine who may solicit, fre-
quently have been voided by judicial decrees. 5 Equal protection challenges
have been pursued less successfully, 6 while attacks asserting vagueness of
statutory language have been vehicles for protecting both political and
charitable canvassers from the arbitrary and capricious application of
poorly drafted regulations.7
1. See Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 624-25 (1976) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
2. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 275 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring).
3. See notes 48-55 and accompanying text infra.
4. See notes 58-60 and accompanying text infra.
5. See notes 61-90 and accompanying text infra.
6. See notes 115-22 and accompanying text infra.
7. See notes 129-41 and accompanying text infra.
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"[A]t common law the presence of a knocker or a bell on the door signi-
fied a license to attempt entry, justifying the initial entry by solicitors and
peddlers . *.". . To counteract this, courts have traditionally "respected
the right of the householder to bar, by order or notice, solicitors, hawkers,
and peddlers" from his property. 9 This right to restrict solicitation has
been extended to private owners of housing developments and apartment
houses, where the tenant still may admit the solicitors if he so desires. 10
Without additional statutes to control visitors, "[u]nless the householder
manifests externally in some way his wish to remain unmolested by the
visits of solicitors, it would seem that the solicitor may take custom and
usage as implying consent to call where such custom and usage exist."'"
To understand noncommercial challenges to regulations, it is vital to
recognize the stringent control that the United States Supreme Court has
held historically that a community may have over commercial canvassing.
Breard v. Alexandria 2 is authority for the principle that a city may impose
a blanket prohibition upon purely commercial door-to-door solicitation.
In Breard, the plaintiff, a regional representative for a magazine pub-
lisher, was arrested while going from household to household seeking sub-
scriptions. Upon challenge, the Court upheld the ordinance authorizing
his arrest, which declared that "going in and upon private residence... by
solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors of
merchandise" 3 to seek sales of merchandise was, absent an invitation from
the owner or occupant of the premises, a nuisance and punishable as a mis-
demeanor. The ordinance was upheld in the face of arguments employing
8. Citizens for a Better Environment v. City of Park Ridge, 567 F.2d 689,
691 (7th Cir. 1975). See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626 (1951).
9. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970). See
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943). Cf. Hall v. Commonwealth,
188 Va. 72, 49 S.E.2d 369 (rule adopted by apartment owner with knowledge and
acquiescence of tenants forbade all visitors to call on tenants unless name given
and announced to tenants from desk in lobby; case has good discussion of cases
upholding the barring of solicitors), appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 875 (1948).
10. People v. Vaughan, 65 Cal. App. 2d 844, 852, 150 P.2d 964, 968
(1944); State v. Martin, 199 La. 39, 48, 5 So. 2d 377, 380 (1941); Hall v. Com-
monwealth, 188 Va. 72, 90, 49 S.E.2d 369, 378, appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 875
(1948). See also Commonwealth v. Richardson, 313 Mass. 632, 640, 48 N.E.2d
678, 683 (1943) (Jehovah's Witnesses were forbidden by the landlord to enter
when they were in the vestibule, but rang the doorbells anyway and were ad-
mitted as the tenants buzzed the door to open it; court held they could not be
barred by the landlord after the tenants had admitted them).
11. Prior v. White, 132 Fla. 1, 19, 180 So. 347, 355 (1938).
12. 341 U.S. 622 (1951), noted in Comment, Constitutional Law-Due Pro-
cess-Freedom of Expression-Commerce Clause- "Green River" Ordinance as
Applied to Door to Door Solicitation for Magazine Subscriptions, 50 MICH. L.
REV. 576 (1952).
13. 341 U.S. at 624.
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the due process clause, the commerce clause, and the first amendment
guarantees of free speech and free press. "Everyone cannot have his own
way and each must yield something to the reasonable satisfaction of the
needs of all."1 4 There is some question as to the continuing validity of
Breard because of the recent expansion of first amendment protection of
commercial speech. 1 5
The Alexandria, Louisiana, ordinance in question in Breard was a
"Green River Ordinance," named after the town in Wyoming where litiga-
tion was instituted initially against such ordinances.' 6 These ordinances
have been held only to restrict commercial activity'7 or transactions of a
commercial nature.1 8 A regulation applied to noncommercial activities
may violate first amendment rights even though the same regulation ap-
plied to commercial activities may not.' 9
Although noncommercial door-to-door solicitation may encompass
religious, charitable, social, or political causes, there is no absolute con-
14. Id. at 626. See also Citizens for a Better Environment v. City of Park
Ridge, 567 F.2d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 1975) (discussed at notes 121-24 and
accompanying text infra).
15. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), which enunciated the
commercial speech doctrine, i.e., such communication is not protected by the
first amendment. But see the series of three decisions where the Supreme Court
rejected the commercial speech doctrine: Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 809 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rights,
413 U.S. 376 (1973). See alsoJ. NOWAK, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
767-80 (1978); Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial
Speech and the Value of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 452-58
(1971).
16. See Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1933). The
ordinance in Green River stated:
The practice of going in and upon private residences ... by solicitors,
peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants and transient vendors of mer-
chandise, not having been requested or invited so to do by the owner or
owners, occupant or occupants of said private residences, for the pur-
poses of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares and merchandise,
and/or for the purpose of disposing of and/or peddling or hawking the
same, is hereby declared to be a nuisance, and punishable as such
nuisance as a misdemeanor.
Id. at 113. Over 400 cities throughout the country between 1935-1939 adopted
ordinances with the same or very similar language prohibiting such door-to-door
visitations as nuisances. Redish, supra note 15, at 452 n.119. These ordinances
have come to be labeled as "Green River Ordinances."
17. Larsen v. Colorado Springs, 142 F. Supp. 871, 873 (D. Colo. 1956);
Green River v. Martin, 71 Wyo. 81, 91, 254 P.2d 198, 199 (1953).
18. Anchorage v. Berry, 145 F. Supp. 868, 870 (D. Alaska 1956).
19. Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 163-65 (1939).
1981] 123
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stitutional right to enter upon the private premises of another to solicit for
one of these purposes. 20 This restriction derives from the principle that
even fundamental rights protected by the first amendment -religious
liberty, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press-are not absolute. 21
General and nondiscriminatory regulation of time, place, and manner is
permitted, but this regulation must be implemented without regard to the
content of speech. 22 Actions of an individual traveler from household to
household need not be objectionable to jusify control. 23 It is within the
government's police power to enforce reasonable door-to-door soliciting
and canvassing regulations 24 that will restrict some persons' desired modes
of communicating their ideas. It is well established, however, "that when
laws may infringe upon sheltered First Amendment freedoms, the Consti-
tution demands that they be held to strict standards of definiteness. " 2 r
Ordinarily, duly enacted provisions enjoy a presumption of constitutional
validity. 26 That presumption, however, does not adhere when there is a
question of improper infringement on the exercise of the first amendment
rights of religion, speech, and press. 27 An ordinance or statute that does
more than reasonably regulate the time, place, and manner of the exercise
of these rights and encroaches significantly upon first amendment activity
20. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 619 (1976).
21. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 570-71 (1942); Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
22. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304
(1940); National Foundation v. City of Fort Worth, 415 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970); American Cancer Soc'y v. City of
Dayton, 160 Ohio St. 114, 124, 114 N.E.2d 219, 224 (1953).
23. "That a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those who
abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to ... in-
cite to crime, or disturb public peace, is not open to question." Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 667 (1925).
24. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1976).
25. Angelico v. Louisiana, 593 F.2d 585, 588 (5th Cir. 1979). See Hynes v.
Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573
(1973); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
26. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); National
Foundation v. City of Fort Worth, 415 F.2d 41, 46 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1040 (1970); Nestre v. City of Atlanta, 255 F.2d 401, 403 (5th Cir. 1958)
(per curiam); Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410, 412 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950); Anchorage v. Richardson Vista Corp.,
242 F.2d 276, 285 (9th Cir. 1957); American Cancer Soc'y v. City of Dayton, 160
Ohio St. 114, 121, 114 N.E.2d 219, 223 (1953); Seattle v. Rogers, 6 Wash. 2d 31,
36, 106 P.2d 598, 600 (1940).
27. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971);
Citizens for a Better Environment v. Village of Schaumburg, 590 F.2d 220, 224
(7th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 100 S. Ct. 826 (1980).
[Vol. 46
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must survive exacting scrutiny under challenge.28 To be upheld, such a
regulation must be supported by a compelling state interest.2 9 Though the
major cases have not articulated this test overtly, this has been the manner
of judicial examination of regulations unduly limiting noncommercial
door-to-door solicitation.
Even when the courts have overturned ordinances, they generally have
agreed that serious dangers, as well as nuisances, are threatened by uncon-
trolled solicitation. While the Supreme Court in Martin v. City of
Struthers30 voided the ordinance of the steel mill town where many inhabi-
tants worked on "swing shifts" -working nights and sleeping days-the
Court admitted:
Ordinances of the sort now before us may be aimed at the protec-
tion of the householders from annoyance, including intrusion
upon the hours of rest, and at the prevention of crime. Constant
callers, whether selling pots or distributing leaflets, may lessen the
peaceful enjoyment of a home as much as a neighborhood glue
factory or a railroad yard which zoning ordinances may prohibit.
• In addition, burglars frequently pose as canvassers, either in
order that they may have a pretense to discover whether a house is
empty, and hence ripe for burglary, or for the purpose of spying
out the premises in order that they may return later. Crime pre-
vention may thus be the purpose of regulatory ordinances. 3'
Cantwell v. Connecticut32 also warned of the dangers to householders pre-
sented by fraudulent solicitation, 33 and Schneider v. State (Town of
Irvington)34 conceded that fraudulent appeals may be made in the name of
religion or charity. 35 Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell,36 a 1976 Supreme Court
opinion which overturned an ordinance limiting political canvassing, cited
Martin in emphasizing that "the lone housewife, has no way of knowing
whether the purposes of the putative solicitor are benign or malignant,
and even an innocuous caller 'may lessen the peaceful enjoyment of a
home.' ,37 Professor Chafee's somewhat acerbic view of door-to-door can-
vassing makes it seem even less desirable:
28. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-65 (1976). "Whenever a state burdens
the freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly, or petition the law must be
analyzed under the strict scrutiny required by the First Amendment ..... J.
NOWAK, supra note 15, at 675.
29. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
30. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
31. Id. at 144.
32. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
33. Id. at 306.
34. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
35. Id. at 164.
36. 425 U.S. 610 (1976).
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[O]f all the methods of spreading unpopular ideas, .. .. [house-to-
house canvassing] seems the least entitled to extensive protection.
The possibilities of persuasion are slight compared with the cer-
tainties of annoyance. Great as is the value of exposing citizens to
novel views, home is one place where a man ought to be able to
shut himself up in his own ideas if he desires.3
8
Despite admitted' threats to the sanctity of the home, in ruling to
uphold the right of canvassers and solicitors, courts have relied on the
historical value of contact made by door-to-door visitation. "Many of our
most widely established religious organizations"3 9 have used travel from
house to house as the means of spreading their doctrine. Labor groups in
recruiting members, the federal government in selling war bonds, politi-
cians in seeking popular support-all, through canvassing, have engen-
dered positive social results. 40 "Door-to-door distribution of circulars is
essential to the poorly financed causes of little people. '" 4' Solicitation by
useful members of society is often for the purpose of "dissemination of
ideas in accordance with the best tradition of free discussion. ' 42 The Court
in Schneider, in contrast to the writings of Professor Chafee, noted that
"[p]amphlets have proved most effective instruments in the dissemination
of opinion. And perhaps the most effective way of bringing them to the
notice of individuals is their distribution at the homes of the people. ,43
Essentially, this clash of values has resulted in the conclusion that
although some control of solicitation is permissible, that degree of control
must be "reasonable" so as not to intrude upon staunchly protected per-
sonal freedoms. The control exerted by ordinances needs to be reasonable
not only in the regulation of zealous religious colporteurs brandishing
sacred scripture, but also in the regulation of secular charities and political
groups. Where criminal prosecutions have been brought under statutes or
ordinances requiring licenses or authorizations for charitable solicitations,
or where affected parties have sought injunctive relief from such regula-
tions, many courts have stated that it is within the police power of the state
or municipality to regulate solicitation of funds for charitable purposes. 4"1
38. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 406 (1941).
39. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. at 145.
40. Id. at 146.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 145.
43. 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939).
44. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); National Foundation v.
City of Fort Worth, 415 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040
(1970); Eye Dog Foundation v. State Bd. of Guide Dogs for the Blind, 67 Cal. 2d
536, 432.P.2d 717, 63 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1967); Ex parte Williams, 345 Mo. 1121,
139 S.W.2d 485, cert. denied, 311 U.S. 675 (1940); People ex rel. Friedman v.
Framer, 208 Misc. 236, 139 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Magis. Ct. 1954); Cincinnati v. Epley,
116 Ohio App. 245, 185 N.E.2d 483 (1962); Exparte White, 56 Okla. Crim. 418,
[Vol. 46
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There is no absolute right tO go door to door seeking funds for charity with-
out reasonable state regulation. 45
Solicitation by religious groups probably has engendered the greatest
amount of litigation challenging such regulations. Sects such as the
Jehovah's Witnesses and the Seventh Day Adventists, as well as members of
the Unification Church, have utilized door-to-door evangelism as a pri-
mary means of spreading their religious beliefs. Their canvassing of resi-
dential areas has led to numerous conflicts between existing solicitation
regulations and first amendment rights of free speech, religion, and
press. 46 It is important to remember that freedom of the press contem-
plates not only the right to print material, but also the right to distribute
it.47
The Jehovah's Witnesses, or Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society,
has been particularly visible in the area of religious solicitation litigation,
because its canvassing includes the sale of religious tracts. The issue arising
repeatedly has been whether these sales constitute commercial activity so
as to cause them to be subject to stricter governmental control. Most courts
have held that, when properly construed and applied, ordinances control-
ling commercial solicitation will not apply to an itinerant evangelist
preaching door to door and offering to sell or take orders for religious
publications. Sales byJehovah's Witnesses and other religious groups have
been held to be only incidental to the dissemination of their religious ideas,
and thus, outside the control of commercial solicitation regulation. 48 State
v. Mead4 9 provided a description of a typical pattern of activity by evan-
gelists that supports this ruling:
[After knocking, if] granted admission, they sought, by word of
mouth and printed booklets and, in some instances, by playing
41 P.2d 488 (1935); Commonwealth v. Creighton (Everett), 111 Pa. Super. Ct.
302, 170 A. 720 (1934); Terrell v. State, 210 Tenn. 632, 361 S.W.2d 489 (1962);
Seattle v. Rogers, 6 Wash. 2d 31, 106 P.2d 598 (1940).
45. National Foundation v. City of Fort Worth, 415 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970).
46. See Haverton, Jehovah's Witnesses and the Federal Constitution, 17
MISS. L.J. 347 (1946); Owen, Jehovah's Witnesses and Their Four Freedoms, 14
U. DET. L.J. 111 (1951); Note, Constitutional Law-Jehovah's Witnesses, 22
NOTRE DAME LAW. 82, 82-91 (1946).
47. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); Lovell v. City of
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938); Zimmerman v. Village of London, 38 F. Supp.
582, 584 (S.D. Ohio 1941); Dulaney v. Municipal Court, 11 Cal. 3d 77, 83, 520
P.2d 1, 5, 112 Cal. Rptr. 777, 781 (1974).
48. Tate v. Akers, 565 F.2d 1166, 1170 (10th Cir. 1977); State v. Mead, 230
Iowa 1217, 1220, 300 N.W. 523, 524 (1941); People v. Barber, 289 N.Y. 378,
384-85, 46 N.E.2d 329, 332 (1943); State v. Meredith, 197 S.C. 351, 354, 15
S.E.2d 678, 679 (1940).
49. 230 Iowa 1217, 300 N.W. 523 (1941).
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record transcripts on a phonograph, to disseminate the doctrines
and teachings of the order. At such homes, as well as those to
which admission was not secured, householders were offered small
packages of the booklets for which they were asked to contribute or
pay the sum of 10 cents. If they declined, a booklet was offered
them without charge.5 0
All receipts were placed in a publication fund which was wholly inade-
quate to cover the cost of publication, while the ministers worked without
compensation and traveled at their own expense.
Many decisions concerning this issue of incidental sales have involved
attempts to prosecute members of the Jehovah's Witnesses under ordi-
nances of the "Green River" type. 5' Some of these courts, by concluding
that the ordinance was inapplicable to the activities of the Witnesses
because those activities were not commercial, avoided questions relating to
the constitutional validity of such ordinances. 52
Members of the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World
Christianity were held in Evans v. Fullard3 not to be selling goods, and
therefore, not required to obtain a license. The canvassers gave flowers
and candy to those who made contributions to them as they went door to
door. The court determined that this sales activity was very minor and only
incidental to the propagation of this sect's faith; thus, these persons need
not register under the commercial solicitation ordinance. The court de-
clined to rule on the freedom of religion issue because this solicitation of
donations did not fall within the purview of commercial regulation.
In Murdock v. Pennsylvania,54 another action involvingJehovah's Wit-
nesses, the Supreme Court emphasized the distinction between purely
commercial and religious activities. The mere fact that these traveling
preachers sell their religious literature rather than give it away, the Court
determined, does not transform their evangelism into a business enter-
prise. Noting the small donation solicited for such pamphlets compared to
the cost of printing, and the unpaid work of the Witnesses, the Court
reasoned that "[f]reedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of
religion are available to all, not merely those who can pay their own
way." 55
50. Id. at 1218-19, 300 N.W. at 524.
51. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
52. See Anchorage v. Berry, 145 F. Supp. 868 (D. Alaska 1956); Darby v.
Colorado Springs, 40 F. Supp. 15 (D. Colo. 1941); Shreveport v. Teague, 200 La.
679, 8 So. 2d 640 (1942); Ex parte Luehr, 159 Tex. Crim. 566, 266 S.W.2d 375
(1954); Green River v. Martin, 71 Wyo. 81, 254 P.2d 198 (1953); Annot., 77
A.L.R.2d 1216 (1961).
53. 444 F. Supp. 1334 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
54. 319 U.S. 105 (1943), noted in Comment, Expanding Civil Liberties in
the Supreme Court, 22 TEX. L. REV. 230 (1944); 18 IND. L.J. 314 (1943).
55. 319 U.S. at 111.
[Vol. 46
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Murdock involved the use of another tactic in an attempt to control
this group. The city of Jeannette, Pennsylvania, had an ordinance requir-
ing all persons who wished to solicit to pay certain sums in order to obtain a
license. The cost of the license varied with the length of time the individual
planned to solicit; daily or weekly rates, for up to three weeks of door-to-
door work, were granted.5 6 The Supreme Court ruled that such fee sched-
ules violated freedom of speech, press, and religion when used to control
religious solicitation. The Court distinguished this ordinance from one
merely requiring registration of strangers in the community5 7 or one im-
posing a nominal fee as a regulatory measure to defray "the expense of
policing the activities in question. ' '5 8 The "power to tax the exercise of a
privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment."5 9 Whether this
restriction was imposed only in residential areas or throughout the whole
city was deemed not an important distinction by the Court. s0
The question most often raised in challenges of rules regulating door-
to-door activity has been whether there is vested in the controlling author-
ity an inordinate amount of discretion to determine who may and who may
not go from house to house. "[S]uch police regulation must have a relation
to the welfare, safety, or health of a community and cannot be arbitrarily,
indiscriminately or whimsically exercised for reasons which have no rela-
tionship with such objectives." 61 Powers to be exercised by an official must
be narrowly drawn within a solicitation ordinance so that the important
interests of protecting citizens from crime and undue annoyance may be
served without determining what messages residents may hear. 62 Statutes
or ordinanhces which delegate to public officials the authority "to license
conduct protected by the First Amendment must set forth definite, objec-
tive guidelines for the issuance of such licenses. 63 When first amendment
rights are involved, courts will not presume that a licensing authority will
perform its duty in a fair and impartial way. 64 The Missouri Supreme
56. Id. at 106.
57. See notes 89-112 and accompanying text infra.
58. 319 U.S. at 113-14. "The constitutional difference between such a
regulatory measure and a tax on the exercise of a federal right has long been
recognized." Id. at 114 n.8. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576-77
(1941).
59. 319 U.S. at 112. See A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934).
See also Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Jones v. Opelika,
319 U.S. 103 (1943) (per curiam).
60. 319 U.S. at 117.
61. American Cancer Soc'yv. City of Dayton, 160 Ohio St. 114, 122-23, 114
N.E.2d 219, 224 (1953).
62. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 616-19 (1976).
63. Perrine v. Municipal Court, 5 Cal. 3d 656, 661-62, 488 P.2d 648, 650,
97 Cal. Rptr. 320, 322 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1038 (1972).
64. In re Porterfield, 28 Cal. 2d 91, 112, 168 P.2d 706, 719 (1946) (ordi-
nance required a labor organizer to purchase a license to solicit for new union
19811
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Court upheld the application of a city ordinance denying a permit to solicit
where clear standards and guidelines were provided for the administrative
official to use in determining whether the applicant's religious or charit-
able cause merited such a license.6 5
Courts have held generally that an administrative officer may not
determine by his own unguided judgment whether a group has in fact a
religious, charitable, political, or philanthropic object. 6 It is up to the in-
dividual in his home to decide whether the group approaching his door is
worthy of patronage. If an official is empowered to license, he will not be
allowed to base his decision upon whether he believes that this is the type of
person who should distribute information from house to house,67 whether
he feels that the cause is "proper or advisable," 68 or whether he deems this
potential solicitor to be of "good moral character." 69 "Censorship, when
done in the guise of determining moral character, is no less censorship and
may not be employed as a basis for inhibiting freedom of expression."70
One fear that arises when a licensing official is given wide discretion to
grant or to deny permits to solicit is that the official will base his decision
upon his own opinion of the content of the ideas sought to be expressed.I
His personal feelings, unguided by strict statutory standards, should not be
relevant. A long line of cases supports this principle that an ordinance
members, and licensing board could issue the permit if it deemed the applicant to
be of good moral character; court ruled that where free speech or any other funda-
mental right is involved, the presumption of proper action by the licensing
authority cannot be relied upon); Aaron v. Municipal Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d
596, 609, 140 Cal. Rptr. 849, 856-57 (1977) (court rejected presumption ad-
vanced by city that licensing authority would perform its duty in a fair and impar-
tial manner where vague standards were provided for the solicitation commission
to determine who could obtain a license to solicit). See also discussion concerning
vagueness notes 127-41 and accompanying text infra.
65. Exparte Williams, 345 Mo. 1121, 1127, 139 S.W.2d 485, 488-89, cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 675 (1940).
66. See Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517, 518-21 (1946); Cantwell v. Connec-
ticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-05 (1940); Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308
U.S. 147, 164 (1939); Ex parte Dart, 172 Cal. 47, 53, 155 P. 63, 65 (1916);
Annot., 76 A.L.R.3d 924, 937-40 (1977). See also Hoover v. State, 161 Tex.
Grim. 642, 645, 279 S.W.2d 859, 861 (1955).
67. Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939).
68. Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 422 (1943).
69. Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939); In re
Porterfield, 28 Cal. 2d 91, 111-12, 168 P.2d 706, 719 (1946); Village of South
Holland v. Stein, 373 Ill. 472, 474, 26 N.E.2d 868, 868 (1940). See also Hoover v.
State, 161 Tex. Grim. 642, 645, 279 S.W.2d 859, 861 (1955).
70. City of Bowling Green v. Lodico, 11 Ohio St. 2d 135, 137, 228 N.E.2d
325, 327 (1967). See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 269 (1957).
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should not vest in an official the power to determine arbitrarily and capri-
ciously whether a peaceful enjoyment of constitutionally protected free-
doms shall be restrained. 72
The case of Lovellv. City of Griffin7 3 involved a challenge to a Georgia
city ordinance prohibiting the distribution of circulars, handbooks, or
literature of any kind without a permit. The regulation had no time and
place limitations written into it, and provided that the permit could not be
obtained without written permission of the city marager. There was no
language restricting the powers of the city manager. Thus, the ordinance
effected much more than simply a restriction on the time, place, or man-
ner of distribution; instead, it gave the official an ability to arbitrarily deny
the right of free press. 74 The Supreme Court held the ordinance void on its
face as the regulation struck at the very foundation of freedom of the press.
The Court wrote that legislation of this type, containing such uncontrolled
official discretion, "would restore the system of license and censorship in its
baldest form." 75 Elimination of previous restraint on publication was a
leading purpose for the inclusion of freedom of the press in the first
amendment. 76
Cantwell v. Connecticut"7 involved Jehovah's Witnesses traversing
New Haven engaging in solicitation.7 8 Newton Cantwell and his two sons
72. See, e.g., Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 616-19 (1976);
Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S.
290, 295 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560 (1948); Cantwell v. Connec-
ticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940); Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S.
147, 164 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-52 (1938); Dulaney v.
Municipal Court, 11 Cal. 3d 77, 86, 520 P.2d 1, 6-7, 112 Cal. Rptr. 777, 784
(1974).
73. 303 U.S. 444 (1938). Alma Lovell was the earliest arrival in the succes-
sion ofJehovah's Witnesses who have litigated in the United States Supreme Court
the question of a first amendment right to engage in religious solicitation.
74. Mrs. Lovell, who distributed religious tracts, did not apply for a permit
because she regarded herself as being sent "by Jehovah to do His work" and felt
that applying for a permit would have been "an act of disobedience to His com-
mandment." Id. at 448. Other cases indicate that this is not an uncommon atti-
tude among the Jehovah's Witnesses. See Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 420
(1943); Tucker v. Randall, 18 N.J. Misc. 675, 676, 15 A.2d 324, 325 (1940).
75. 303 U.S. at 452.
76. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245 (1936); Patter-
son v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
77. 310 U.S. 296 (1940), noted in Constitutional Law-Fourteenth Amend-
ment-Religious Liberty, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 1067 (1940); Constitutional Law-
Constitutionality of Statute Permitting State Licensing Official to Pass on
Religious Nature of Cause, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1941).
78. Employing the same procedure as was used by the canvassers in State v.
Mead (see notes 47 & 48 and accompanying text supra), the solicitors, the Court
noted, were working "a thickly populated neighborhood where about ninety per-
1981]
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were criminally charged under a statute that forbade solicitation "for any
alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause," unless the cause had
been "approved by the secretary of the public welfare counsel."7 9 The
secretary was to determine whether a bona fide cause was involved; if so,
he would issue a certificate revocable at any time.
The Supreme Court held that the statute deprived the Cantwells of
religious liberty without due process of law. Freedom of religion is the free-
dom to act as well as to believe. This regulation was a prior restraint; it did
more than regulate the time, place, and manner of solicitation. If, purely
upon the exercise of one official's judgment, the cause was determined not
to be truly religious, the group was absolutely prohibited from soliciting.
"Such a censorship of religion as the means of determining its right to sur-
vive is a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment and included
in the liberty which is within the protection of the Fourteenth. "80 The
Court rejected the state's contention that any constitutional defect was
corrected by the availability of judicial review; the system still was one of
previous restraint.
Uncontrolled official discretion likewise was the basis for the invalida-
tion of ordinances in Schneider v. State (Town oflrvington)8' and Largent
v. Texas.8 2 A Jehovah's Witness challenged the regulation in Schneider,
which required house-to-house canvassers and solicitors to obtain a written
permit from the chief of police. The permit was not to issue if it were
decided that "the canvasser . . . [was] not of good character or . .. [was]
canvassing for a project not free from fraud."8 3 As written, the ordinance
applied equally to commercial and noncommercial canvassers. It banned
unlicensed door-to-door communication of any view or the advocacy of
any cause. The ordinance was held to violate freedoms of speech and press
when applied to noncommercial canvassers. The Court lumped charitable
solicitation with solicitation in the name of religion; thus, protections
given charitable groups going door to door would rise to the level of those
afforded religious and political freedoms rather than be lowered to the
level given to speech that is characterized as commercial. The Court in
Largent, faced with another appearance by a Witness, cited Lovell,
Schneider, and Cantwell in holding unconstitutional an ordinance which
cent of the residents were Roman Catholics." 310 U.S. at 301. The phonograph
record used included an attack upon the Catholic religion. This brazen manner
of dissemination is the sort that prompted Professor Chafee to comment that the
Jehovah's Witnesses were "a sect distinguished by great religious zeal and
astonishing powers of annoyance." Z. CHAFEE, supra note 38, at 399.
79. 310 U.S. at 301-02.
80. Id. at 305.
81. 308 U.S. 147 (1939), noted in Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech
and Press-Handbill Ordinances, 6 MO. L. REV. 103 (1941).
82. 318 U.S. 418 (1943).
83. 308 U.S. at 158.
132 [Vol. 46
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allowed a mayor unguided discretion in the issuance of permits to solicit.
-Such permits would issue if he deemed it "proper and advisable."8 4 Other
cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses' violations of solicitation regulations
have held that neither a company town 8 5 nor a federally managed village
of defense workers8 6 may require evangelists to obtain permission from
officials to solicit.
Discretion, although of a different type, again was the key issue when
the Witnesses appealed to the Supreme Court in Martin v. City of
Struthers.8 7 The Court struck down a city ordinance that made it unlawful
for a solicitor or canvasser to ring the doorbell or knock on the door of a
private home to distribute literature to the residents. The discretion in
question was the citizens' lack of discretion: the substitution of "the judg-
ment of the community for the judgment of the individual householder."88
Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to
receive it was deemed vital; such naked restriction of the dissemination of
ideas, as this ordinance stipulated, could "serve no purpose but that for-
bidden by the Constitution. 8 9 In denying in such a peremptory fashion
the possibility of distribution of literature, the community, the Court felt,
had its priorities ordered badly. Strict regulation had become more impor-
tant than the exercise of first amendment rights. Justice Murphy's concur-
ring opinion made a significant comment upon this: "[F]reedom of
religion has a higher dignity under the Constitution than municipal or per-
sonal convenience.1
90
The main component of any ordinance that attempts to control door-
to-door activity is a requirement that parties applying for a permit supply
identification. The United States Supreme Court has indicated that this is
a permissible requirement, at least in the situation of solicitation of funds.
In Cantwell v. Connecticut,"l the Court wrote: "Without doubt a State
may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requirihg a stranger
in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any
purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause
which he purports to represent. '92 That a state or local government may
regulate canvassers by identification devices was reiterated in Martin v.
City of Struthers9 3 and Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell.9 4 Murdock v. Pennsyl-
84. 318 U.S. at 422.
85. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
86. Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946).
87. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
88. Id. at 144.
89. Id. at 147.
90. Id. at 151-52 (Murphy, J., concurring).
91. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
92. Id. at 306.
93. 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943).
94. 425 U.S. 610, 618 (1976), cited in Young, Supreme Court Report, 62
A.B.A.J. 1027, 1029 (1976).
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vania95 distinguished as unconstitutional a license tax upon registration to
solicit, rather than a registration system where "those going from house to
house are required to give their names, addresses and other marks of iden-
tification to the authorities. " 96
Cantwell, Martin, and Murdock all involved Jehovah's Witnesses in
their accustomed role. Hence, the Supreme Court has hinted that a re-
quirement of mere registration of those engaged in religious canvassing
with incidental solicitation of funds does not infringe upon constitutional
rights.9 7
In Hynes, political campaign workers contacted householders, but ap-
parently no fund raising was involved. While the majority opinion did not
concern itself extensively with the requirement of identification, Justice
Brennan in his concurring opinion joined by Justice Marshall made a
strong argument that an ordinance requiring a political canvasser to iden-
tify himself discourages free speech. The importance of the preservation of
anonymity in a "door-to-door exposition of ideas" 98 was asserted by Justice
Brennan. He cited Talley v. California,99 where the Court invalidated a
Los Angeles ordinance requiring handbills to display the names and ad-
dresses of persons writing, printing, or distributing them. Talley dealt
vehemently with the question of freedom of expression:
Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books
have played an important role in the progress of mankind. Perse-
cuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have
been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anony-
mously or not at all .... Even the Federalist Papers, written in
favor of the adoption of our Constitution, were published under
fictitious names. It is plain that anonymity has sometimes been
assumed for the most constructive purposes.' 0 0
Justice Brennan argued in Hynes that requiring identification of those
engaged in door-to-door canvassing might constrain such activity; the fear
of reprisal could deter free exposition of controversial issues. Examples of
volatile topics were mentioned in which a canvasser, faced with a require-
ment of identification, might fear retaliation: civilian police review
boards, the decriminalization of certain types of conduct, and the recall of
an elected police official.' 0 ' Brennan noted that, unfortunately, appre-
hension of reprisal may be well founded. There have been in recent years
"many instances of penalties for controversial expression in the form of
95. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
96. Id. at 113.
97. See Lansdale Borough v. Phillips, 66 Montg. County L. Rep. 329, 334,
42 Pa. Munic. L. Rep. 137, 142 (1950).
98. 425 U.S. 610, 625 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
99. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
100. Id. at 64-65.
101. 425 U.S. at 625-26 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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vindictive harassment, discriminatory law enforcement, executive abuse
of administrative powers, and intensive government surveillance."' 0 2
These occurrences take on a particularly threatening aura when it is
remembered that the first amendment affords its broadest protection to
political speech, to assure that the free exchange of ideas will bring about
desired social and political changes. 03 The Supreme Court had noted in
an earlier opinion that any rule that would limit orderly discussion at an
appropriate time and place must be warranted by an impending or actual
public danger.1 0 4
In a footnote to his concurring opinion in Hynes,10 5 Justice Brennan
questioned Justice Black's "passing remark"1 6 in Martin that "[a] city can
... by identification devices control the abuse of the privilege by criminals
posing as canvassers. '" 107 Brennan noted two later decisions, Talley v. Cali-
fornia10 8 and Thomas v. Collins, 0 9 which both spoke of the oppressive
aspects of a requirement of identification. 0 He also pointed out that a
Martin footnote implied that such a requirement would be valid only when
applied to "a stranger in the community" who requests permission to
"solicit funds.""' Justice Brennan's footnotes in his concurring opinion in
Hynes related that an Oradell, New Jersey, type ordinance, which would
require a person desiring to canvass for a political cause to notify the police
department in writing "for identification only,""12 would imperil first
amendment rights if the applicant were not seeking funds.
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Hynes asserted "that none of
our cases have ever suggested that a regulation requiring only identifica-
tion of canvassers or solicitors would violate any constitutional limita-
tion."" 3 Yet, he cited for support only Cantwell and Martin,1 4 both in-
volving religious canvassing with incidental solicitation of contributions.
102. Id. at 626 (Brennan, J., concurring).
103. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
104. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
105. 425 U.S. at 628 n.4 (Brennan, J., concurring).
106. Id.
107. 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943).
108. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
109. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
110. Talley involved distribution of handbills on streets and in public areas,
not door-to-door. Thomas concerned union organizers speaking in public. A
lower Pennsylvania court distinguished Thomas from the activity of the Jehovah's
Witnesses, emphasizing the greater criminal danger inherent in door-to-door
solicitation. Lansdale Borough v. Phillips, 66 Montg. County L. Rep. 329, 335,
42 Pa. Munic. L. Rep. 137, 144 (1950).
111. 425 U.S. at 628 n.4 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 n.14 (1943)).
112. Id. at 625-26 nn.1 & 2 (Brennan, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
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Regardless of the eventual outcome of this dispute, Justice Brennan's
distinguishing basis, seeking contributions, appears puzzling in light of the
cases noted above in which identification requirements were deemed per-
missible. Cantwell, Martin, and Murdock all stemmed from activity of the
Jehovah's Witnesses, whose solicitation of contributions through "sales" of
religious tracts consistently has been held to be incidental to their main
purpose of disseminating their beliefs. Because the Supreme Court has
deemed this subordinate activity not to involve enough financial dealing to
subject their canvassing to the supervision of commercial solicitation regu-
lations, it seems it should not be enough for fund raising to be the distin-
guishing element in Justice Brennan's test.
Solicitation regulations also have been challenged on an equal protec-
tion ground, most often by private charitable groups questioning the con-
stitutional validity of regulations requiring permits to solicit. Such cases
have arisen, with very little ultimate success, in situations in which one
group asserts that the requirements it must meet in order to effect compli-
ance are more burdensome than those required of another group.
In Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind,"'
the California Supreme Court upheld a statute making it unlawful to
solicit funds for any person purporting to provide guide dogs for the blind,
unless that person had a license to train such animals. The plaintiff argued
that the statute offended the equal protection clause of both the state and
federal constitutions by imposing special licensing procedures on guide
dog charities while not so regulating other charities. Maintaining that the
law affected equally all persons engaged in the operation of such schools,
the court remarked "that legislation is not discriminatory if it relates to
and operates uniformly upon the whole of a single class, properly selected.
There is no constitutional requirement of uniform treatment, but only
that there be a reasonable basis for each classification." ' 1 6
In National Foundation v. City of Fort Worth, " 7 religious and social
groups who solicited funds solely from their own members were not made
to comply with the requirements of the solicitation ordinance. The court
denied an equal protection challenge to these exemptions, noting that to
be constitutional the classification need only have some reasonable basis.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found this classifi-
cation to be neither unreasonable nor arbitrary because "[t]he considera-
tion in such solicitations are different from solicitations from the general
public on public streets and in house to house canvassers.""18
Exemptions from solicitation statutes for certain well-recognized or
local groups generally have been held not to be arbitrary or unreasonable,
115. 67 Cal. 2d 536, 432 P.2d 717, 63 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1967).
116. Id. at 549, 432 P.2d at 726, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 30 (citation omitted).
117. 415 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970).
118. Id. at 48.
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or to deny equal protection.1 1 9 The exception to the rule took place in
Seattle v. Rogers,1 20 in which the challenged ordinance made it unlawful
to conduct a charity campaign where a part of the proceeds was withheld
for compensation, unless charity solicitation licenses were obtained at the
cost of $1,000 per charity and $100 for each solicitor. The defendant
argued that the provision of the ordinance which exempted one named
group, the annual campaign for the Seattle Community Fund, was uncon-
stitutional as discriminatory under the Washington Constitution. The city
council apparently had enacted the ordinance with the opinion that the
exempted charity "was worthily and honestly conducted, and resulted in
benefit to the public, while many others should be classified as no better
than frauds.' ' 21 The court found the exemption to be arbitrary and sug-
gested that operation of this ordinance could result in the Community
Fund campaign being allowed to proceed while permits were denied to
other legitimate campaigns with admirable objectives, as well as to
fraudulent campaigns. The court held the ordinance to be unconstitu-
tional and void because of this discrimination. 122
Political groups which advocate a cause while incidentally seeking con-
tributions to help promote their cause are best exemplified by citizens'
environmental groups. Challenges to ordinances affecting these groups
closely resembly those made by religious groups as well as those made by
nonpolitical, charitable organizations. An ordinance prohibiting the
solicitation of donations for charitable purposes without an invitation
from the owner or occupant of a residence was challenged in Citizens for a
Better Eni'ronment v. City of Park Ridge. 2 13 CBE went door to door in the
Chicago area to inform the public of its activities concerning pollution and
environmental issues, to discuss environmental problems, and to solicit
contributions. The group sought injunctive relief against enforcement of
the ordinance. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit, while noting that a city may impose reasonable regulations, reversed
119. Commonwealth v. McDermott, 296 Pa. 299, 303-04, 145 A. 858, 859-60
(1929); Commonwealth v. Schuman, 125 Pa. Super. Ct. 62, 66-67, 189 A. 503,
504-05 (1937); Commonwealth v. Creighton (Everett), 111 Pa. Super. Ct. 302,
305, 170 A. 720, 721 (1934); Lansdale Borough v. Phillips, 66 Montg. County L.
Rep. 329, 336-37, 42 Pa. Munic. L. Rep. 137, 145-46 (1950); Terrell v. State, 210
Tenn. 632, 643-45, 361 S.W.2d 489, 493-94 (1962). But see Aaron v. Municipal
Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 596, 609-10, 140 Cal. Rptr. 849, 857 (1977) (such a provi-
sion was held to be unconstitutionally vague).
120. 6 Wash. 2d 31, 106 P.2d 598 (1940).
121. Id. at 37, 106 P.2d at 600.
122. Seattle v. Rogers was decided with a companion case, Seattle v. Bartlett,
6 Wash. 2d 731, 106 P.2d 601 (1940). This case, involving an unlicensed solicitor
for a go-to-church fund, was consolidated with Seattle v. Rogers on appeal and
the decision in both rested upon the same basis: the Seattle ordinance was dis-
criminatory.
123. 567 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1975).
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the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction and held that a city
may not impose upon a nonprofit group expressing essentially political
ideas a blanketprohibition on canvassing for funds. 24 This situation was
distinguished by the court from the classic prohibition on commercial can-
vassing upheld in Breard v. Alexandria. 125 The Seventh Circuit wrote that
a statute of this scope in a political context, despite the significant state ob-
jectives of prevention of crime and protection of householders' privacy,
was "an unnecessarily broad restraint on the communication of ideas."' 26
The same group reappeared in Citizens for a Better Environment v.
Village of Schaumburg,127 in which they had attempted, again in the
Chicago area, to obtain a permit to go door to door. An ordinance pro-
vided that a permit would not be issued unless seventy-five percent of the
proceeds of solicitation were used solely for charitable purposes by the
organization seeking such a permit. CBE was denied a license because it
failed to meet this requirement. The village argued that the seventy-five
percent rule was to protect its citizens by distinguishing commercial from
charitable organizations. The village also pointed out that the ordinance
was not fatally flawed by vagueness or by the vesting of impermissible dis-
cretion in licensing officials.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit responded
that there were other possible reasons for a regulation to be held invalid
besides vagueness and overly broad official discretion, and held the per-
centage requirement to be unreasonable as applied to this type of organi-
zation. The court felt that it was not being inconsistent with National
Foundation v. City of Forth Worth,128 which upheld an ordinance limiting
the cost of solicitation of contributions to charity to twenty percent of the
total receipts. The ordinance allowed an organization, in that case a non-
political, charitable group that did not meet the twenty percent limit, to
show that its own percentage was not unreasonable. National Foundation
recognized that a fixed percentage limitation for a broad class of charit-
able organizations would be difficult to justify.
Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell'2 presents the clearest case of canvassing
door to door for the purpose of purely political speech. Fund raising was
not even mentioned by those who challenged the ordinance. In contrast to
Justice Brennan's many qualms in Hynes over identification requirements,
ChiefJustice Burger expressed none. For the majority the determining fac-
tor was the vagueness of the ordinance. Hence, another possible vehicle for
challenge to canvassing and solicitation regulations has been brought to
the forefront.
124. Id. at 692.
125. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
126. 567 F.2d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 1975).
127. 590 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 100 S. Ct. 826 (1980).
128. 415 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970).
129. 425 U.S. 610 (1976). See notes 94-114 and accompanying text supra,
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A statute which either forbids or dictates the doing of an act in terms so
ambiguous "that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential due
process of law.""30 This is the test for unconstitutional vagueness. "Vague
laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.... A vague law
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and
juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application." 131 Courts look
especially close at vague laws when they may have an effect on first amend-
ment rights. 132
In Hynes, where the ordinance being contested required potential can-
vassers for charitable or political causes to notify the police department in
writing for identification only, 133 the majority ruled that the regulation
failed to meet the test of specificity articulated for the first amendment
area. 3 4 The challenge was to the meaning of phrases in the ordinance -
"recognized charitable cause," "Federal, State, County or municipal...
cause," "Borough Civic Groups and Organizations" - and all were deemed
unclear. 135 Since the rule did not dictate what sort of written identification
was to be provided to the police, the phrase "notify the Police Department,
in writing, for identification only" also was held to be vague. 136
A California Court of Appeals in Aaron v. Municipal Court 37 likewise
used vagueness as a basis for overturning an ordinance requiring anyone
soliciting anything of value on the representation that it was for a charit-
able purpose to obtain a permit. Relying on Hynes, the Aaron court re-
marked that the investigation provision of the ordinance, which gave a
commission the power to issue a permit if satisfied "that such purpose is
worthy and not incompatible with the public interest" and "that the appli-
cant and other persons engaged in such solicitation are of good character,"
was unconstitutionally vague.13 Another provision found to be vague was
the passage which gave the commission discretion to waive requirements
"where the applicant is known to be a bonafide charitable organization of
recognized integrity and long standing as such."'13 9
130. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). See also Peo-
ple v. Barksdale, 8 Cal. 3d 320, 327, 503 P.2d 257, 262, 105 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6
(1972).
131. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (footnotes
omitted).
132. Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966).
133. See notes 98-114 and accompanying text supra.
134. 425 U.S. 610, 620-22 (1976). "[G]overnment may regulate ... only with
narrow specificity." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
135. 425 U.S. at 621.
136. Id.
137. 73 Cal. App. 3d 596, 140 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1977).
138. Id. at 608-09, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
139. Id. at 609-10, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 857. See also Perrine v. Municipal
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These cases in which vagueness was the basis for challenging an ordi-
nance are similar to those opinions mentioned earlier in which unbridled
discretion in licensing officials was deemed to threaten arbitrary and
capricious enforcement. 140 Aaron v. Municipal Court noted this relation-
ship.1 4 1
While under appropriate circumstances there probably are many ordi-
nances ripe for challenge by a canvasser or solicitor, 142 a person faced with
an unconstitutional licensing law could choose to ignore it. He could
engage "with impunity in the exercise of the right of free expression for
which the law purports to require a license, and he is not precluded from
attacking its constitutionality because he has not applied for a permit.'
43
The cases discussed in this Comment have indicated that the courts
tend generally to resolve doubts in favor of noncommercial canvassers or
solicitors going door to door over the demands for control by a state or local
government. Not surprisingly, there has been dissatisfaction with this
policy tendency. Professor Chafee leveled an attack at the highest court in
the land:
Freedom of the home is as important as freedom of speech. I can-
not help wondering whether the Justices of the Supreme Court are
quite aware of the effect of organized front-door intrusion upon
people who are not sheltered from zealots and imposters by a staff
of servants or the locked entrance of an apartment house. 144
Court, 5 Cal. 3d 656, 661-62, 488 P.2d 648, 650-51, 97 Cal. Rptr. 320, 322-23
(1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1038 (1972).
140. See notes 61-90 and accompanying text supra.
141. 73 Cal. App. 3d at 609, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 856-57.
142. The Columbia, Missouri, regulation of solicitors and canvassers appears
to be such an ordinance. COLUMBIA, MO., CODE §§ 7.3000-.3090 (1978). Provi-
sions exempting "recognized charitable organizations" and "bona fide non-profit
charitable, educational, political, social welfare or religious organizations," id. §
7.3010(B), from the terms of the ordinance might not survive attacks using a
vagueness theory. Though the regulation is meant only to apply to commercial
solicitation, this vagueness could lead to application of certain questionable pro-
visions to a noncommercial applicant. These provisions authorize the license in-
spector to examine the applicant's "character or business responsibility"; if he
deems either to be unsatisfactory, a permit to solicit will not be issued. Id. §
7.3030. Elements of the ordinance lend themselves easily to arbitrary enforce-
ment, and the opportunity for the unbridled exercise of discretion on the part of
the official is evident.
143. Aaron v. Municipal Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 596, 599 n.2, 140 Cal. Rptr.
849, 850 n.2 (1977). See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 & n.2
(1969); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 55-56 (1965); Staub v. City of Bax-
ley, 355 U.S. 313, 318-19 (1958); Burton v. Municipal Court, 68 Cal. 2d 684,
687-88, 441 P.2d 281, 284, 68 Cal. Rptr. 721, 724 (1968).
144. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 38, at 407. As one writer has commented:
The net result of this sequence of decisions is that the Jehovah's Wit-
[Vol. 46
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In noncommercial door-to -door visitation, the importance of the freedoms
detailed in the first amendment often have been held to outweigh the
annoyances noted by Professor Chafee. These rights are most vital to the
free expression and exchange of ideas, the constitutional life's blood of
society, and should be afforded this preferential treatment.
ROBERT E. PINNELL
nesses enjoy four freedoms: freedom of the press, freedom of speech,
freedom of religion, all of them guaranteed by the Constitution, and
freedom to invade the rights of others, guaranteed to them by the major-
ity of the members of the Supreme Court.
Owen, supra note 46, at 134.
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